Immigration · Primary-source case analysis

Niz-Chavez v. Garland: The Stop-Time Notice Must Be One Document

By Aneeta Mishra and Timothy Chan

Published April 14, 2026

Niz-Chavez followed Pereira and answered whether the government could cure an incomplete notice to appear by sending the missing hearing information later.

The two-document sequence

The government first served Augusto Niz-Chavez with a document containing the charges but not the hearing’s time and place. It later sent a separate notice supplying that information and argued that the documents collectively stopped his accrual of continuous presence.

The statutory text

The Court focused on Congress’s use of the singular phrase “a notice to appear” and on the statutory definition requiring written notice specifying the listed information. Ordinary usage and the statute’s structure pointed to one document, not an assemblage delivered over time.

The holding

A notice sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule must be a single document containing all information required by section 1229(a)(1), including the time and place of the removal proceeding. A later document cannot combine with the first to create the statutorily defined notice for that purpose.

What the case does not do

The decision concerned the stop-time rule for cancellation eligibility. It did not hold that every defective notice eliminates immigration-court jurisdiction or resolves every notice issue, and later statutes and decisions must be evaluated for the particular remedy sought.

Key takeaways

• Review the original notice itself, not merely the later hearing history.
• For the stop-time rule, the required information must be in one document.
• The remedy depends on the statutory issue being litigated.
• Preserve every notice and proof of service in the administrative record.