Rios Leyva: ICWC Did Not Turn a Pending Derivative Petition into Automatic Habeas Release

Closed family correspondence folder and notice envelope outside an empty Indiana visiting room.

Rios Leyva v. Warden, No. 3:26-cv-737 DRL-SJF (N.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2026), ECF No. 15, denied an individual detention-habeas petition. The order is a recent application of Immigration Center for Women and Children v. Noem that distinguishes pending humanitarian filings from an individual deferred-action grant. It also separates custody review from review of removal-related rulings.

The benefits and custody records followed different paths

The petitioner’s wife filed a U-visa petition, and he sought derivative benefits through Form I-918 Supplement A and an I-192 waiver application. His wife received a bona fide determination notice. The record did not establish that USCIS had granted him his own bona fide determination or deferred action. He was later taken into immigration custody. Rios Leyva, slip op. at 1–4.

The immigration judge denied bond after finding danger and flight risk, later ordered removal, and declined jurisdiction over the I-192 request. A renewed custody request based on asserted changed circumstances was also denied. Appeals from the custody and removal decisions remained pending. These were distinct procedural events; the district court did not treat them as one undifferentiated benefits dispute.

Pending-petition class relief did not establish automatic release

The parties agreed that section 1226(a) governed custody. The petitioner relied on the ICWC litigation and his pending derivative application. The court distinguished the Pending Petition Class from the Deferred Action Class, observing that the latter required an actual grant absent from this record. It rejected the premise that the wife’s favorable notice itself established the petitioner’s grant. Id. at 5–8.

As the court understood ICWC’s relief, the stay of the challenged 2025 policy restored the earlier discretionary framework for pending petitioners; it did not require categorical release of every person with a pending application. The district court therefore did not regard class membership alone as resolving the legality of this individual custody. This account is the September 18 court’s application of ICWC, not a replacement for the operative class orders.

Individualized custody proceedings mattered

The petitioner had received individualized bond consideration, including the later request based on changed circumstances. The district court found that the asserted class and benefits arguments did not establish entitlement to release from the conceded section 1226(a) custody on this record. Id. at 7–9.

That conclusion should not be generalized into a rule that any two hearings necessarily satisfy every due-process challenge. The order assessed the claims presented and the actual procedural history. It did not decide whether another person with an operative deferred-action grant, a different custody statute, or different procedural defects would obtain relief.

Removal and waiver review exceeded this custody proceeding

The court declined to review the immigration judge’s removal order and handling of the I-192 request through this habeas action, citing the statutory channel for removal review. It did not adjudicate whether USCIS should grant the underlying benefits or whether the petitioner ultimately qualified for a waiver. It also dismissed respondents other than the immediate custodian under the Seventh Circuit rule it applied. Id. at 9–10.

The petition was denied and the case closed. This is a Northern District of Indiana order, not Ninth Circuit precedent. For California readers, its value is the precise separation of grant evidence, class relief, custody process, and removal review. It is not a categorical instruction about whom to name or which remedy to seek in every California case, and it does not establish the later result of the pending agency appeals.

What this means for families comparing ICWC orders

This language summarizes the court’s record-specific conclusion, not a general rejection of humanitarian protections. A reader must identify the person’s actual grant and the operative class relief before using the order as an analogy. Where either differs, the reasoning requires fresh analysis. The order also does not resolve subsequent agency appeals or establish what later happened in the class litigation.

The decision states:

“no individual grant of deferred action, and no class-wide order requiring his release”

Rios Leyva, slip op. at 10.

Questions about this issue

Did the petitioner prove an individual deferred-action grant?

The court found that the record did not establish one; his wife’s favorable notice did not supply it.

Did the order invalidate ICWC?

No. It interpreted the class relief when resolving this individual petition.

Did habeas decide the I-192 application’s merits?

No. The court declined removal-related review through the custody proceeding.

Continue with An I-192 Waiver Dispute During Detention: Separate the Custody, Benefits, and Removal Records.

Read the primary decision: Rios Leyva, September 18, 2026 order (ECF 15) (PDF).

Match the individual grant and custody record to the requested remedy

Mission X Trial Lawyers can review the records and legal issues described here. Call (888) 611-4683 or email office@mcxlegal.com.