Kadovic: Community Residence and Work Authorization Supported a Pre-Detention Hearing

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Review the primary official source.

In Kadovic v. Santacruz, the Central District of California granted habeas relief on procedural due-process grounds on September 14, 2026. The court rejected the proposition that a person must previously have been detained and formally released to possess a protected interest in remaining at liberty. Its reasoning depended on the specific community residence, pending asylum application, work authorization, and government conduct described in the record.

The record before the court

Kadovic entered on a B-2 visa in July 2024 and timely applied for asylum in December 2024. The order describes approximately two years in the community, employment, a lease, a driver’s license, church attendance, and compliance with address and biometrics requirements. He received employment authorization while his asylum application remained pending. The order did not identify a criminal record.

ICE arrested him at Los Angeles International Airport on July 22, 2026, as he prepared to take a domestic flight to Chicago after a vacation. He was detained at Adelanto. The government relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and argued that, because this was his first detention, the appropriate protection was access to a bond hearing rather than release for lack of pre-detention process.

Why first detention did not end the inquiry

Magistrate Judge Patricia Donahue treated the government’s acquiescence in Kadovic’s extended community residence, together with his work authorization and pending application, as supporting a liberty interest. The court did not require a prior formal release from immigration custody as an indispensable prerequisite.

Applying the Mathews framework, the court emphasized the strong private interest in physical freedom, the risk of error where no individualized pre-detention assessment of danger or flight risk had occurred, and the absence of a sufficient explanation for denying that process. The government had not identified materially changed circumstances establishing a need to detain him without a prior hearing.

The order also noted that the government had not meaningfully answered the procedural due-process argument, treating that omission as an additional basis supporting relief. That litigation feature matters: the decision should not be summarized as though it resolved every possible government argument on a fully developed adverse record.

The relief was specific and limited

The court granted the procedural due-process count and ordered release within 24 hours under the conditions applicable before detention. It directed return of specified belongings and a status report within three days of release. The substantive due-process and warrant-related counts were dismissed without prejudice because the court did not need to decide them.

This was not a ruling granting asylum, lawful permanent residence, or immunity from future enforcement. The court expressly left room for future detention consistent with due process. Nor does the release direction itself establish that release occurred; that requires a later compliance record. This analysis concerns the filed September 14 order.

How to read the decision alongside contrary outcomes

Other district-court decisions have taken a narrower view of liberty interests before first detention. The September 11 Bo Chen order discussed in the companion firm’s library denied relief on a different record that included short detention and no request for an available initial bond hearing. The orders should be presented as a meaningful disagreement, not blended into a single uniform rule.

For case evaluation, preserve the actual admission documents, asylum filing record, work authorization, length and conditions of community residence, compliance history, arrest chronology, and government explanation. Those materials allow counsel to assess whether a proposed analogy rests on comparable facts. Kadovic is a fact-specific district-court order, not a guarantee that any person with a pending application must receive the same relief.

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