Cabrera: Decades of Failed Removal Efforts and Continued Detention

Introduction

United States District Judge Hernán D. Vera of the Central District of California granted a preliminary injunction ordering the immediate release of Petitioner Ernesto Maden-Cabrera from immigration detention at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center. On the record, the government failed to demonstrate any significant likelihood that removal to Cuba or any third country would occur in the reasonably foreseeable future, rendering continued civil detention unlawful under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The court did not reach the merits of the underlying habeas petition.

Material Facts Treated as Uncontested or Found on the Record

Cabrera was ordered removed to Cuba in 1995. ICE detained him for nearly ten years without effectuating removal, then released him under an order of supervision in 2005. The motion record indicated lengthy compliance with supervision before ICE re-detained him at a routine check-in in April 2026. A government declaration showed that a new travel-document request to Cuba began in May 2026. Respondents later filed a notice stating an intent to transfer him to Mexico, despite earlier sworn representations that ICE was not pursuing third-country removal. Mexico had not accepted the transfer, and the court had already found no demonstrated exigency or compliance with the requirements governing involuntary third-country removal.

Issue

Whether Petitioner satisfied the Winter standard for a preliminary injunction, specifically whether he demonstrated a likelihood of success in establishing that no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future exists under Zadvydas, thus rendering his re-detention unlawful.

Parties' Positions

Petitioner argued that more than thirty years of failed removal efforts to Cuba, combined with the absence of any meaningful changed circumstances since his 2005 release, established that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. He further argued that attempted removal to Mexico was unlawful because he had not consented, Mexico had refused to accept the transfer, and the government had not complied with the procedural requirements for third-country removal.

Respondents contended that ICE's active travel-document request to Cuban authorities and stated intent to remove Petitioner constituted changed circumstances justifying re-detention, and that the public interest in immigration enforcement weighed against release.

Governing Law

The court applied the four-factor preliminary injunction standard from Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 5 (2008), on a sliding-scale basis as recognized in the Ninth Circuit. The substantive detention analysis rested on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), under which detention beyond the 90-day removal period is permissible only for a reasonable time, with six months as the presumptive outer limit. The court also applied the principle, recognized in district court decisions within the circuit, that when a noncitizen is re-detained following an initial Zadvydas release, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate changed circumstances rendering removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court further noted that as cumulative post-order detention grows, the window of what constitutes the "reasonably foreseeable future" correspondingly shrinks.

Reasoning

The court found that roughly ten cumulative years of prior detention, during which the government never obtained travel documents, created an overwhelming inference that Cuba would not accept Petitioner's return. Respondents' May 2026 travel-document request—lodged more than three decades after the removal order—did not constitute a changed circumstance sufficient to rebut Petitioner's showing. On third-country removal to Mexico, the court found that Respondents had contradicted their own representations, that Mexico had declined to accept the transfer, and that the government had not demonstrated compliance with the statutory and regulatory prerequisites for involuntary third-country removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b). On irreparable harm, the court noted that unlawful detention is an injury not compensable in damages. On the merged equities and public interest factors, the court observed that adherence to procedural limits on immigration detention is itself part of the public interest in immigration-law enforcement.

Exact Holding

Petitioner demonstrated a likelihood of success on his Zadvydas claim, irreparable harm from continued unlawful detention, and a balance of equities and public interest tipping sharply in his favor. The preliminary injunction issued requiring immediate release.

Exact Disposition and Conditions

Respondents were ordered to release Petitioner forthwith. The parties were ordered to file a joint status report on compliance within three days of the order. Respondents are enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner without immediately providing notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which the burden falls on Respondents to demonstrate changed circumstances warranting re-detention. Respondents are separately enjoined from removing Petitioner to any third country without notice, a meaningful opportunity to respond, and full compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and due process requirements.

What the Decision Did Not Decide; Precedential Limits

The court did not resolve the underlying § 2241 habeas petition on the merits. It did not determine whether Petitioner's removal to Cuba will ever be possible. It did not address what would constitute adequate changed circumstances in a future re-detention proceeding. The decision is an unpublished slip opinion with no Ninth Circuit precedential effect; it is persuasive authority only.