A.S. v. LAUSD: A Background Check Did Not Authorize Rejection for These Dismissed Misdemeanors

A.S. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, Nos. B335692 & B335732 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2026), holds that the district’s background-check obligations did not justify rejecting these two applicants based on dismissed misdemeanor convictions. The published opinion affirmed both judgments. Its organizing distinction is between obtaining criminal-history information and using a particular dismissed conviction to restrict employment.

Two applications tested the same statutory boundary

A.S. applied for a part-time after-school program position after a misdemeanor battery conviction. E.M. sought a legal-secretary position after a misdemeanor grand theft conviction. Both convictions had been dismissed under Penal Code section 1203.4. The district rejected the applicants on account of those convictions, maintaining that its responsibility to protect children justified the screening decision. Separate trial courts granted summary judgment against the district, and the appeals were consolidated. A.S., slip op. at 2–4.

The court cautioned that “expungement” is colloquial shorthand. Section 1203.4 relief does not eliminate the conviction for every legal purpose. The relevant question was the relationship between that relief and Labor Code section 432.7, not an abstract theory that the records had ceased to exist.

The basic prohibition applied to the district

Section 432.7(a)(1) prohibits specified employer inquiries about dismissed convictions and their use as a factor in employment decisions. The district argued for a narrower meaning of “employer” in the sentence restricting use than in the sentence restricting inquiries. The court rejected that reading as inconsistent with the provision’s ordinary structure. The district had both asked about and used the convictions. Id. at 5–6.

That established the prohibition’s application unless an exception supplied authority for the challenged action. The court considered subdivisions (m) and (n), rather than treating general background-check duties as sufficient by themselves.

Subdivision (m) required a particular statutory conviction

Subdivision (m) addresses specified circumstances involving a “particular conviction” identified by law. The district was indeed subject to laws requiring information about, or restricting hiring for, certain convictions. But it did not identify a relevant restriction for misdemeanor battery or misdemeanor grand theft in these positions. The general Education Code treatment of expungements did not identify the particular convictions necessary for its argument. Id. at 6–9.

The court also emphasized the Legislature’s removal of language authorizing employers to “utilize” information from subdivision (m). The statutory history supported a narrower exception, responding to overbroad use of dismissed convictions. That reasoning prevents treating the exception as an unrestricted license to reject any applicant whose report contains an old conviction.

Subdivision (n) allowed compliance with actual duties

Subdivision (n) permits compliance with legally required background checks and employment restrictions. The district’s duty to run a check did not establish authority to use everything the check revealed. Where a law required a particular hiring restriction, compliance with that restriction could be permissible; the district had not identified such a restriction for these two offenses. Id. at 9–11.

The legislative-history discussion reinforced the text rather than replacing it. The court affirmed both judgments and awarded the applicants their appellate costs. Id. at 11–14. The result addresses these convictions and the asserted exceptions. It does not eliminate statutory disqualifications for other offenses, guarantee hiring, or decide every employment consequence of every form of record relief.

What this means for applicants and school employers

The court’s fact-specific phrasing prevents two opposite overreadings. A required background check is not blanket permission to use every dismissed conviction, but the decision also does not abolish particular statutory hiring exclusions. The useful comparison is between the actual offense, the relief granted, the position, and the exception invoked. That comparison preserves the distinction the published opinion enforced.

The decision states:

“We construe this statute and conclude no exception defeats the general prohibition on the facts of this case.”

A.S., slip op. at 2.

Questions about this issue

What judgments were affirmed?

The judgments against LAUSD in the two applicants’ consolidated cases.

Why did the background-check duty not end the analysis?

Obtaining a report and using a particular dismissed conviction are different statutory questions.

Did the court invalidate all school hiring exclusions?

No. It required the district to identify an applicable exclusion for the particular convictions at issue.

Continue with Rejected for a School Job After a Dismissed Conviction: Identify the Exact Hiring Restriction.

Read the primary decision: A.S., September 22, 2026 published opinion (PDF).